POLITICAL TAX CYCLES: POLITICAL EFFECTS ON TAX REVENUES AND TAX BURDEN IN TURKEY (1945-2014)

Abstract

This study analyzes the effects of general elections on tax revenues and tax burden in Turkey. Approaches that have ignored the political decision mechanism, behaviors of political actors, and institutional structure have been insufficient in explaining the variation in taxation variables. In this context, this study asserts that politicians manipulate taxation in order to get re-elected. Incorporating the institutional structure into the analysis, the study develops hypotheses that can help better understand variations in fiscal and economic variables. The study tests its main hypothesis that politicians manipulate taxation during election times through a vector error correction (VEC) estimation on data from 1945 to 2015. The study finds no significant relationship between 18 election years and tax revenues and tax burden in Turkey. It can be argued that one of the main reasons for this finding is political instability that has been observed in the Turkish political system until the early 2000s. Despite having 18 elections, Turkey had 46 governmental changes between 1945 and 2014.